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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






     J.T., on behalf of J.T.,     




NEWARK BOARD OF EDUCATION 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-12-03566) 
Honorable Susan D. Wigenton, District Judge 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 25, 2014 
 
BEFORE: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and, VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 28, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant, a special needs middle-school student, filed this action claiming that 
appellee, the State-Operated School District of the City of Newark, violated the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., by 
2 
 
refusing to provide in-class support services
1
 at the middle school located closest to 
appellant’s home, the Speedway Avenue School, which is about 443 feet from her 
residence.  The School District, however, did offer J.T. in-class support at the Alexander 
Street School, which was located about .8 of a mile from her residence.  J.T. did not 
accept the Alexander Street School placement and, instead, sought an injunction directing 
the School District to provide the support at the Speedway Avenue School.  J.T. was 
unsuccessful both before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and in the District Court 
which entered a judgment in favor of the School District on April 5, 2013.  She then 
appealed to this Court.   
 In our review of the matter we recognized that because J.T. had graduated from 
the Speedway Avenue School during the litigation, her claim for injunctive relief might 
be moot.  Accordingly, we directed the parties to file briefs on the mootness issue.  The 
parties filed the briefs, both contending that the case was not moot because J.T. could 
seek compensatory education to substitute for the denial of the in-class support services 
at the Speedway Avenue School if she prevailed on this appeal.  After we examined the 
parties’ briefs, we brought their attention to the circumstance that J.T. may have waived 
her claim for compensatory education through the execution of an explicit waiver of that 
claim in the administrative proceedings before the ALJ.  The School District then 
reversed its position and contended that the appeal was moot, but J.T. adhered to her 
contention that the appeal was not moot.  We have determined that the case is moot, and, 
                                              
1
 The program implicated in these proceedings is referred to as a Resource In-Class 
Support program (“RCI”) as outlined in her Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). 
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accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal as well as the entire case without prejudice to J.T. 
bringing an action seeking compensatory education in a separate proceeding.
2
   
 We supplement the foregoing abbreviated history of the case with some additional 
procedural history and facts.  On October 27, 2011, J.T. initiated her administrative 
proceeding by filing a Petition for Due Process claiming that the School District had 
denied her a Free and Appropriate Public Education by seeking to place her in the 
Alexander Street School, where it would provide in-class support, rather than in the 
Speedway Avenue School, the school she had been attending.  In her petition, J.T. 
requested, among other relief, compensatory education.
3
  On January 31, 2012, J.T. 
signed a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Legal Issues in the administrative proceeding that 
expressly waived “all claims for compensatory education in connection with” her 
administrative claims, “notwithstanding the contentions set forth in her petition.”  A36.  
The ALJ found in favor of the School District on the merits of the case, and, in his 
opinion, noted that J.T. had waived all claims for compensatory education.  
Notwithstanding the ALJ’s decision, J.T. remained in the Speedway Avenue School from 
which she ultimately graduated. 
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 In fact, J.T. already has instituted such a proceeding.  We take no position on whether 
she will be entitled to relief in that proceeding. 
 
3
 J.T. filed her petition under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and section 504 of the 




 On June 13, 2012, J.T. appealed from the ALJ’s decision to the District Court.4  In 
her District Court complaint, J.T. sought a reversal of the ALJ’s decision, an injunction 
compelling the School District to send her to the Speedway Avenue School with in-class 
support services, attorney’s fees and costs, and “any such other relief as this Court 
determines necessary and proper.”  She, however, did not request that the School District 
be ordered to provide her with compensatory education to substitute for the denial of in-
class support services at the Speedway Avenue School.  The District Court affirmed the 
decision of the ALJ, and J.T. then appealed to this Court.
5
  In her briefs in this Court, J.T. 
did not seek compensatory education and she limited her claim to a request for injunctive 
relief.   
 As we have indicated, although the School District initially had contended that 
notwithstanding her graduation the case was not moot, it has reversed its position and 
now claims that the case is moot because J.T. has waived her claim for compensatory 
education.
6
  J.T., however, argues that the waiver applied only to claims accruing before 
                                              
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). 
 
5
 If this case were not moot, we would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
6
 The School District argues that J.T. expressly waived all compensatory education 
claims accruing up to January 31, 2012, the date the Joint Stipulation was executed.  The 
School District argues with respect to claims accruing after that date that J.T. is estopped 
from claiming compensatory education because J.T.’s mother caused the harm to J.T. by 
continuing to send her to the Speedway Avenue School, thus forfeiting J.T.’s claim for 
in-class support services.  We need not linger on this estoppel point because J.T. 
expressly waived her right to compensatory education, without qualification, and did not 
seek compensatory education in the District Court.  Accordingly, until this late stage of 
this litigation, she has prosecuted the case seeking only injunctive relief.  In our view, this 
conduct—coupled with her express waiver—makes her ineligible for any type of 
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the waiver was executed, but that she may seek compensatory education for denial of in-
class support services occurring after she filed her original Petition for Due Process on 
October 27, 2011.   
 Ordinarily, if a student has made a claim for compensatory education in an IDEA 
case, we can adjudicate her appeal even though she has graduated or moved to a 
residence within a different school district, a point that we made clear in D.F. v. 
Collingswood Borough Board of Education, 694 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2012).  In D.F., the 
District Court, despite “[a]cknowledging that compensatory education was a potentially 
valid remedy,” “nonetheless determined that [the student’s] claims were moot” and 
dismissed the case because D.F. moved out of the school district to another state.  Id. at 
496.  On D.F.’s appeal we reversed, and explained that claims for compensatory 
education, which compensate students “for rights the district already denied him,” id. at 
497 (internal quotation marks omitted), were not mooted by the out-of-district move, as 
we determined that such a result was necessary in order to effectuate the “very purpose of 
the IDEA.”  Id. at 499.  D.F., however, is distinguishable from this case because D.F., 
unlike J.T., expressly sought compensatory education in the district court.  See D.F. v. 
Collingswood Public Schs., 804 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (D.N.J. 2011).   
 Moreover, if a plaintiff did not seek compensatory education in the District Court 
and her request for equitable relief has become moot, we must dismiss the appeal if a 
provision for compensatory education had been the only possible remedy other than 
                                                                                                                                                  
compensatory education in this action.  We add, however, that we are not concerned on 
this appeal with the possibility that she might be able to obtain compensatory education 
services in a separate proceeding. 
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injunctive relief available to her in the district court.  We cite several cases supporting 
this point.  For example, in Thomas R.W. v. Massachusetts Department of Education, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that a case was moot where on appeal the 
plaintiff sought reimbursement for educational expenses he incurred because he had 
“failed to articulate a claim for damages in the district court.”  130 F.3d 477, 480 (1st Cir. 
1997).  Although the plaintiff attempted to raise his claim for reimbursement in his reply 
brief in the court of appeals, the court rejected this effort as “fall[ing] short of the 
requisite timeliness and formulation necessary to preserve a claim for damages.”  Id.  
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed a case as moot even 
though on appeal the appellants sought damages to reimburse them for educational 
expenses they had incurred where the appellant “failed to articulate a claim for damages 
in the district court.”  Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442 F.3d 588, 597 (7th 
Cir. 2006).  The court found that the appellants’ attempt to raise a damages claim in their 
reply brief was insufficient, and thus it deemed the claim to be waived.  Id. at 598.  
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a claim for 
compensatory education raised only at oral argument, and not before the District Court, is 
insufficient to save an otherwise moot equitable claim.  Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. 
Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2005).   
 Here, J.T. raised a claim for compensatory education when she initiated this action 
administratively but then expressly waived her right to that remedy.  The ALJ and the 
District Court both addressed only the narrow question J.T. actually presented: whether 
she was entitled to in-class support at the Speedway Avenue School.  See A95 (ALJ 
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noting that the issue “is a narrow one…whether [the in-class support program] must be 
provided in the neighborhood school, Speedway Avenue School”); A4 (District Court 
noting that the ALJ resolved a “narrow issue,” and “the issue before this Court is whether 
the evidence supports the ALJ’s decision”).7  We will not allow J.T. to raise a claim for 
compensatory education at this stage of litigation, after she expressly waived that claim 
before the ALJ and did not discuss that claim in the District Court or in this Court in her 
brief.  Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.  In addition, we remand the 
matter to the District Court to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the case.  See United 
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104 (1950); Donovan ex rel. Donovan 
v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2003).  No costs will be 
allowed on this appeal.   
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 J.T.’s generalized prayer for relief in her complaint, requesting “any other relief 
the Court may deem just and proper,” is insufficient to save her otherwise moot case from 
dismissal.  See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71, 117 S.Ct. 
1055, 1070 (1997) (ordering remand for dismissal of case as moot, observing that “claim 
for nominal damages, extracted late in the day from [a] general prayer for relief and 
asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, bore close inspection”); Fox v. Bd. 
of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1994) (dismissing case as 
moot and refusing to read damages claim into boilerplate prayer “for such other relief as 
the Court deems just and proper”).   
